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The Cross-Florida Barge Canal has been one of the most heated environmental controversies politicians have faced in recent years.' Public opposition
rose to a crescendo until a Presidential order to halt the canal was issued on
January 19, 1971.2 The disposition of the thousands of acres of land condemned for the project across the Florida Peninsula is one of the most significant problems that must be resolved as a result of the canal project cessation. This commentary will suggest various alternative remedies that may be
available to landowners seeking to have their property returned.
The affected land may be divided into three classes: (1) land taken under
a temporary or perpetual easement; (2) land taken in fee simple with a right
of access to the canal given to the prior owner in the condemnation proceedings; and (3) land either condemned by or conveyed to the Canal Authority in
fee simple absolute.3
EASEMENTS

The abandonment doctrine appears to be the best method of extinguishing the easements taken for the canal, although other methods exist.* Termination of easements by abandonment is composed of two elements: act and

1. St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Sept. 5, 1971, §B at 1, col. 1. See also Cornwell, From
Whence Cometh Our Help? Conservationists Search for a Judicial Forum for Environmental
Relief, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 451 (1971); Little, New Attitudes About Legal Protection for
the Remains of Florida'sNatural Environment, 23 U. FLA. L. REy. 459 (1971).
2. 29 CONG. Q. 199 (1971). President Nixon's press release ordered a cessation of all
federal funds that had been earmarked by Congress for the canal. The constitutionality of
the President's act has been questioned. See Canal Authority v. Resor, Civil No. 71-92 (M.D.
Fla., filed Feb. 12, 1971). See also Boggs, Executive Impoundment of Congressionally Appropriated Funds, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 221 (1972).
3. The Canal Authority is a state agency governed by FLA. STAT. §374 (1969). The breakdown of the 62,164 acres acquired for the canal is:
Perpetual Easements
9,660 acres
Temporary Easements
1,185 acres
Fee Simple with Right of Access
10,529 acres
Fee Simple
30,011 acres
U.S. Forest Service
7,579 acres
Back Waters (Inglis Reservoir)
3,200 acres
TOTAL
62,164 acres
Interview with Col. Giles Evans, Director, Canal Authority, in Jacksonville, Fla., June 25,
1971. Approximately one-third of the canal has been constructed, including the clearing
of ground and the filling of the Rodman Reservoir, the construction of several locks and
other canal structures, and the excavation of certain portions of the canal itself. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, Civil No. 2655-69 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 27,
1971).
4. For a discussion of such methods see R. BoYva, FLORIDA REAL ESTAa TRANSACTIONS
§23.06 (1969).
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intention. 5 Proof of an intent to abandon is the more troublesome. The
quantum of proof necessary to sustain evidence of intent to abandon would
probably be decisively satisfied in the present situation if the President's
order to halt construction of the canal is upheld in the courts. 7 Moreover, the
Canal Authority itself has stated that if the canal is abandoned the easements would be extinguished.8 The easements would not be extinguished,
however, if a simple non-use of the property were found 9 rather than abandonment. A permanent injunction against continuance of the canal project,
however, would probably vitiate such an argument. 10
Termination of the easement by abandonment raises the additional problem of return of compensation.:" A dearth of Florida law exists on this subject. The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, in interpreting a statute that
required forfeiture of an easement if it were not used within five years by
the condemnor, indicated that where less than a fee simple is condemned,
the word "forfeit" carries no suggestion of reimbursement to the condemnor
of the price paid.12 Although the present situation is distinguishable from the
Indiana case, in both situations abandonment has deprived the injured condemnee o the use of his land for a considerable period. Therefore, retention
of the compensation should not necessarily imply unjust enrichment.
The easement may terminate automatically upon abandonment or the
condemnee may have to resort to judicial process to have the easement extinguished. 3 Pragmatically, the landowner should file suit to quiet title and
allow the court to remove the cloud imposed by the easement.
FEE SIMPLE WITH A RIGHT OF AccEss To THE CANAL

In north central Florida 10,529 acres were taken in fee for the barge
canal, but the condemnee was given a right of access to the waterways.' 4 The
"right of access" provision provides these condemnees with a viable argument

5.

Alamosa Creek Canal Co. v. Nelson, 42 Colo. 140, 93 P.

1112 (1908). See also R.

BoYER, supra note 4, §23.07 (2).
6. See generally Canal Authority v. Resor, Civil No. 71-92 (M.D. Fla., filed Feb. 12,

1971).
7. See note 2 supra. See, e.g., Maryland & P. R.R. v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit Trust Co.,
233 Md. 615, 166 A.2d 247 (1960) in which the court stated that: "I]here can be an abandonment of an easement is clearly recognized in this jurisdiction, where the acts of abandon-

ment were of a decisive character and clearly indicate an intention to abandon." See also
In

re Harlem River Drive, 307 N.Y. 447, 121 N.E.2d 414

(1954).

8. Canal Authority v. Resor, Civil No. 71-92 (M.D. Fla., filed Feb. 12, 1971).
9. See Albury v. Central & So. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 99 So. 2d 248

(3d D.C.A.

Fla. 1957).
10. See generally Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, Civil No.
2655-69 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 27, 1971).
11. Unjust enrichment may obligate the condemnee to return the award made by the
condemning authority. Cf. State v. Pellitt, 220 Ind. 593, 45 N.E.2d 480 (1942).
12. Id. at 595, 45 N.E.2d at 483.
13. See, e.g., Genet v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 150 So. 2d 272 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
14. See note 3 supra.
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for return of the land. A court could find that a "right of access to the waterway" connotes a condition subsequent to the fee simple. 15 A condition subsequent need not necessarily be expressed in formal words, but is to be gathered
from all the facts and circumstances surrounding a conveyance, whether such
conveyance is a deed or a judgment in condemnation. 16 Thus, if the provision
providing a right of access were a conditional limitation on the deed given,' 7
the condemnee could obtain a fee simple absolute by exercising his right
of reentry.
If the right of access provision is determined to be an independent rather
than a dependent condition, however, a landowner's claim for rescission or
reversion would be unsuccessful.' s In Zambetti v. Commodores Land Co.,' 9
the Florida supreme court held that intention of the parties controls in determining whether covenants are dependent or independent. Zambetti involved a contract to sell land, which contained a promise to pave a road in
front of the land within a specified period. 2 When the condition was not
met, the vendee was granted damages but denied rescission. Zambetti is, however, distinguishable from the instant situation in that the condition for
paving the road could easily have been met, only at a later date. In the canal
situation, the condition may never be satisfied.
FEE SIMPLE ABSOLUTE

The landowner whose property was condemned in fee simple absolute has
only one legally plausible basis for rescission of the deed, an attack on the
necessity of the original taking." A necessity argument was unsuccessfully

15. Cf. Owenby v. City of Quincy, 95 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1957). A fee simple on a condition subsequent is a type of defeasible fee, a term that would also apply to a qualified
fee. There is a technical difference between a qualified fee and a fee simple on a condition
subsequent in the methods used for recovery. See L. SIrEs, FuTURa INmaasr 28-32 (2d ed.
1966). However, the courts have not chosen to use the distinction and term them both defeasible fees. See, e.g., Seadade Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 245 So. 2d 209,
216 (Fla. 1971) (Erwin, J., specially concurring).
16. In State v. Columbia Ry. Gas & Elec. Co., 112 S.C. 528, 100 S.E. 355 (1919), South
Carolina had conveyed property to a private corporation for the purpose of building a
canal within a specified time. The canal was not completed and the court found this to be
a condition upon which the deed was given. The court then stated: "The purpose of construction [of the deed given] is to find out the intention, however it may be expressed....
No particular phraseology and no technical words are necessary to create a condition subsequent . . . and, when such condition is created, provision for reverter or re-entry for
" Id. at 538, 100 S.E. at 358.
breach thereof is not indispensable ....
17. See, e.g., Villafranca v. Cotitia, 147 Fla. 715, 3 So. 2d 397 (1941).
18. Sun City Holding Co. v. Schoenfeld, 97 Fla. 777, 122 So. 252 (1929).
19. 102 Fla. 586, 136 So. 644 (1931).
20. Id.
21. The basis of this approach assumes that the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to attacking a final judgment in condemnation where an unlawful use will be made
of the property. Poe v. State Road Dep't, 127 So. 2d 898 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1961). Using the
property for recreational purposes could be interpreted as an unlawful use-one for which
the land could not have been condemned originally. Staplin v. Canal Authority, 208 So. 2d
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raised in CarlorCo. v. City of Miami2 2 where land, condemned for an airport,
was never used for that purpose. The Florida supreme court upheld a trial
court's pronouncement that once fee simple absolute title is taken, the land
will never revert to the condemnee even where the necessity for taking has
been extinguished.23
In City of Atlanta v. Fulton Co.,24 owners of a lake and a contiguous parcel
of property contested the sale of the property, after abandonment by the
condemnor waterworks utility. The court, in finding for the condemnee, held: 25
[I]n construing a statute authorizing the taking of private property for
public use, it will not be implied that a greater interest or estate can
be taken than is necessary to satisfy the language and object of the act;
and where as in this case, the land was condemned by the Board of
Water Commissioners "for waterworks purposes," fee-simple title "for
all purposes" was not necessary to satisfy the object of the act. The
words "in fee simple" as used in this provision of the charter must
be construed in connection with the words which immediately follow
"of such property so required" for waterworks purposes, and as thus
construed must be held to be only descriptive of the extent of the duration of the enjoyment of the easement thus acquired.
The City of Atlanta case dealt with a constitutional prohibition against
taking property for public purposes and using it for private purposes. 26 The
Georgia court implied that when the condemnor ceases the use for the specified
public purpose for which it was taken, the property must revert or the constitution is violated. Since Florida now has a somewhat similar constitutional
provision,27 the same rule could be applicable in the instant situation where
property is condemned for the special purpose of building the Cross-Florida
Barge Canal. To use the property in any other manner would seem to violate
the constitutional mandate.
Other cases involving abandonment of canals have followed the rule that
no reversionary right exists in the landowner once fee simple absolute title
has been taken. 28 Most of the prior cases, however, dealt with abandonment
853 (Fla. 1968). There are two classes of landowners here - those whose land was taken
by the power of eminent domain and those who "voluntarily" conveyed the property to
the Canal Authority under the threat of condemnation. This latter class will not be dealt
with in this analysis; however, their remedy would seem to be a suit for rescission on much
the same basis as those where land was condemned. Furthermore, if the problem is unresolvable in a court, the legislature should consider passing a remedial statute. See sug-

gested statute in APPENDIX infra.
22. 62 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1953).
23. Id. at 300.
24. 210 Ga. 784, 82 S.E.2d 850 (1954).

25. Id. at 785, 82 S.E.2d at 853.
26.

Id. at 785, 82 S.E.2d at 852.

27. See FIA. CONsT. art. X, §6 (a): "No private property shall be taken except for a
public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner."
28.

Graf v. City of Newark, 124 N.J.L. 312, 11 A.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Whitey v. State,

96 N.Y. (51 Sick.) 240 (1884).
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after several years of operation, whereas the barge canal land was abandoned
before construction.
In Whitey v. State29 a canal was abandoned after construction and use,
and the state converted it to a public road. The landowner sued for damages
arising from the abandonment, or alternatively, for the state to maintain the
canal. The court stated:3 0
So far as relates to the position that the land has been converted
to another and a different use, it may be observed that if the state
acquired an absolute title to the fee, then it had a right to dispose of it
as it deemed best.
In Graf v. City of Newark3" the court also refused to recognize a conditional limitation and reversion where a canal was built and thereafter
abandoned. Addressing itself to the issue of whether the land could be used
for the purpose of a roadway, the court construed the canal as being a water
highway and stated: "[I]t was a public transportation use and as such not inconsistent with the second use made of the property." 3'
Other cases, however, have held that abandonment of a canal leads to a reversion. In People v. White 3 lands taken for the Erie Canal and thereafter
abandoned were held to have reverted to the original owner or his successors.
The statutory authorization under which the lands were taken declared that
"the fee simple of such premises so appropriated shall be vested in the people
of this state."' 34 The court construed the act as intending a fee determinable
by the cessation of the use for which the land was taken: 35
The state has no right to take what is not necessary for the improvement. I see no reason why this restriction does not apply as well to the
duration of the estate as to the extent of actual occupation. When the
canal is abandoned, the land taken can no longer be said to be "necessary to the prosecution of the improvement"; and it is only to the extent
29. 96 N.Y. (51 Sick.) 240 (1884).
30. Id. at 247. The landowners in Whitey, however, were not asking for the return
of their land, but only incidental damages where the land was converted to a different use.
31. 124 N.J.L. 312, 11 A.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
32. Id. at 314, 11 A.2d at 766. If a Florida court would construe the Cross-Florida
Barge Canal as a water highway, a logically analogous situation, the applicable sections
of the Highway Code would apply and the landowners would be entitled to recover their
land. FLA. STAT. §336.12 (1969) provides: "The act of any commissioners inclosing or
abandoning any such road, or in renouncing or disclaiming any rights in any land delineated
on any recorded map as a road, shall abrogate the easement theretofore owned, held,
claimed or used by or on behalf of the public and the title of fee owners shall be freed
and released therefrom; and if the fee of road space has been vested in the county, same
will be thereby surrendered and will vest in the abutting fee owners to the extent and
in the same manner as in case of termination of an easement for road purposes."
33. 11 Barb. 26 (N.Y. 1851).
34. Id. at 27.
35. Id. at 28. The court noted: "A qualified, base, or determinable fee, is an interest
which may continue for ever [sic], but is liable to be determined by some act or event
circumscribing its continuance or extent." Id.
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of the land "so appropriated" which is taken, appraised and paid for
according to the previous provisions of the section, that the title is
declared to vest in the state.
In another case involving a canal, Vought et ux. v. Columbus H.V. & A.R.
Co.,3 a state statute authorized abandonment and lease of property to a railroad company. 37 On a suit to recover possession by the landowners, the court
observed:38
When appropriated, they are to take a complete title to the premises
to the extent and for the purposes set forth in and contemplated by the
act. The purpose contemplated by the act is the use of the land for
canal purposes so long as the canal is maintained; so that, when the
use ends, the title they were permitted to take ends, for it is not a
title in fee simple they are permitted to take, but a complete one for
the uses and purposes of the canal. The company could not then, when
the use ends, sell them to others; on the contrary, the lands must revert
to the owner of the freehold.
Railroads as quasi-public utilities have eminent domain powers.3 9 In the
great majority of cases involving railroad condemnation, abandonment has
resulted in reversion to the landowner-condemnee. 40 Although fee simple
absolutes were given, the courts in these cases had reasoned that the statutory
power to acquire lands expressly refers to railroad purposes. The courts have
then reduced the interest taken to a qualified fee-an implied condition
subsequent- and where the condition is not met, that is, continuing the use,
the land reverts to the condemnee. 41 Since the Florida Legislature has given
both the Canal Authority and railroads the same privilege with respect to
land ownership,4 2 the same principles should be persuasive for reversion upon
abandonment. Like the railroad, the Canal Authority's statutory power is
dearly limited-a right to acquire land to build the Cross-Florida Barge
43
Canal.
Another potential argument for a reversion might be found in Seadade
Industries, Inc. v. Florida Power 8c Light Co. 4 where the Florida supreme
court held that the protection of environmental resources is a constitutional

36. 58 Ohio St. 123, 50 N.E. 442 (1898).
87. Id. at 130-33, 50 N.E. at 444.
88. Id. at 139,50 N.E. at 450.
39. FLA. STAT. §360.01 (4) (1969).
40. See, e.g., Abercrombi v. Simmons, 71 Kan. 538, 81 P. 208 (1905); Annot., 155 A.L.R.
380 (1945); Annot., 132 A.L.R. 142 (1941).
41.

See note 35 supra.

42. FLA. STAT. §360.03 (Supp. 1970) provides: "Whenever the land or water privileges
mentioned in the preceding section shall belong to the State of Florida, the use thereof
for the aforesaid purposes shall vest in said railroad or canal company upon the occupancy
of both or either ...

43. FLA.

STAT.

for such purposes...

§374.05 (1) (a) (1969).

44. 245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971). See Comment, Eminent Domain: Public Purpose and
Conservation of Natural Resources, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 392 (1972).
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mandate.4 5 Justice Ervin, in a concurring opinion, stated that where environmental factors are to be considered in the determination of an eminent domain
proceeding, and where a fee simple absolute is given "the fee simple is a defeasible fee ....
[T]he condemned unexcavated canal land and other lands
taken would then return to the condemnee if the condemning body were
unable to obtain the necessary authorization ... from pollution control agencies. In the event this were to occur, the condemnee should be required to
return all the condemnation money awarded . . . within a short period of
time. . . otherwise, title absolute in the condemned land would vest in the
46
condemnor."
This concurring opinion is likely to be of some value in effecting disposition of the lands. In both, abandonment for environmental purposes, as
in the instant situation, and denial of a permit, the condemned land can no
longer be used for the project purposes.
CONCLUSION

The courts and legislature of this state will soon have the burden of
remedying the prior landowners' precarious situation. The legislature and
courts can, also, begin to provide this state with an environmentally sound
future, not for us as much as for our children and grandchildren.
The Corps of Engineers, the Canal Authority, and other such groups
should consider the constitutional mandate for a clean environment set forth
in Seadade. Only then can we be assured that the "Sunshine State" will remain
bright and clean for future generations. The public purpose inherent in
progress must be balanced against the environment, without any presumption
that progress is our most important product.
ROBERT A. MANDELL

45. 245 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1971). The opinion may be relevant in determining the
necessity of the original taking, as the Canal Authority would not have met the dictates
of the National Environmental Policy Act. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-47 (1970). See Comment, supra

note 44.
46.

245 So. 2d 209, 216 (Fla. 1971) (concurring opinion).

APPENDIX
The Florida Legislature could simplify the problems of the landowners by enacting a
statute that might read:
If

the Cross-Florida Barge Canal ever ceases existence, either by legislative, executive,

or court decree, all easements will be automatically extinguished whether they be of
a perpetual or temporary nature. And, furthermore, where the land upon which no
structures have been erected to which title was taken by the Canal Authority in fee

simple absolute, the landowner, his heirs or assigns, from whom it was originally purchased shall have first refusal on the property, after reimbursement of purchase price
and interest. If, in the estimation of the Outdoor Recreation Developmental Board, there
is land that could be used for a public purpose as a park or lake, title will be transferred
to the appropriate agency, assuming little or no environmental damage. This act will
be construed liberally to best effectuate the legislative intent.
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